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We examine the impact of Chinese import competition on broad measures of technical 
change - patenting, IT and TFP – using new panel data across twelve European countries from 
1996-2007. In particular, we establish that the absolute volume of innovation increases within the 
firms most affected by Chinese imports in their output markets. We correct for endogeneity using 
the removal of product-specific quotas following China’s entry into the World Trade Organization 
in 2001. Chinese import competition led to increased technical change within firms and reallocated 
employment between firms towards more technologically advanced firms. These within and 
between effects were about equal in magnitude, and account for 15% of European technology 
upgrading over 2000-2007 (and even more when we allow for offshoring to China). Rising Chinese 
import competition also led to falls in employment and the share of unskilled workers. In contrast to 
low-wage nations like China, developed countries imports had no significant effect on innovation.  
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A vigorous political debate is in progress over the impact of globalization on the economies 
of the developed world. China looms large in these discussions, as her exports grew by over 15% 
per year in the two decades up to the Great Recession of 2007-2009. One major benefit of Chinese 
trade had been lower prices for manufactured goods. We argue in this paper that increased Chinese 
trade has also induced faster technical change from both innovation and the adoption of new 
technologies, contributing to productivity growth. In particular, we find that the absolute volume of 
© The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Review of 
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innovation (not just patents per worker or productivity) increases within the firms more affected by 
exogenous reductions in barriers to Chinese imports. We distinguish between the impact of import 
competition on technology through a within firm effect and a between firm (reallocation) effect, and 
find that both matter.  
Several detailed case studies such as Bartel, Ichinowski and Shaw (2007) on American 
valve-makers, Freeman and Kleiner (2005) on footwear or Bugamelli, Schivardi and Zizza (2008) 
on Italian manufacturers show firms innovating in response to import competition from low wage 
countries. A contribution of our paper is to confirm the importance of low wage country trade for 
technical change using a larger more representative samples of firms and plants. 
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FIGURE 1:  Share of all imports in the EU and US from China and all low wage countries 
 
Notes:  Calculated using UN Comtrade data. Low wage countries list taken from Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) and 
are defined as countries with less than 5% GDP/capita relative to the US 1972-2001. 
 
 
A major empirical challenge in determining the causal effect of trade on technical change is 
the presence of unobservable technology shocks. To tackle this endogeneity issue we use China’s 
entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and the subsequent elimination of most 
quotas in the ensuing years under the Agreement on Clothing and Textiles (formerly the Multi Fiber 
Agreement). These sectors are relatively low tech, but were still responsible for over 31,000 
European patents in our sample period. Importantly, our data allows us to trace the responses of 
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firms to the relaxation of the quotas, allowing us to isolate the immediate, quota-related impacts of 
increased Chinese import competition from expectations that firms may have built up about the 
policy prior to 2001. 
 We present two core results. First, on the intensive margin, Chinese import competition 
increases innovation within surviving firms. Firms facing higher levels of Chinese import 
competition create more patents, raise their IT intensity and increase their overall level of TFP (they 
also increase R&D, management quality and skill levels and reduce prices and profitability). 
Second, Chinese import competition reduces employment and survival probabilities in low-tech 
firms. Firms with lower levels of patents or TFP shrink and exit much more rapidly than high-tech 
firms in response to Chinese competition. Thus, our paper jointly examines the effects of trade on 
survival/selection and innovation. The combined impact of these within and between firm effects 
causes technological upgrading in those industries most affected by Chinese imports. We focus on 
China both because it is the largest developing country exporter, and because China’s accession to 
the WTO enables us to plausibly identify the causal effects of falling trade barriers. However, we 
also show results for imports from all other developing countries, and find a similar impact on 
technical change. In contrast, imports from developed countries appear to have little or no no impact 
on technology. 
 We also offer some back of the envelope quantification of Chinese import effects on 
technical change. Over 2000-2007 China appeared to account for almost 15% of the increase in 
patenting, IT and productivity. Furthermore, this effect is two to four times larger when we 
incorporate offshoring and allow for endogeneity. These results suggest that trade with emerging 
nations such as China may now be an important factor for technical change and growth in richer 
countries. 
 Our paper relates to several literatures. First, there is a large literature on the relationship 
between trade and productivity. Although many papers have found that trade liberalization increases 
aggregate industry productivity1, the mechanism through which this occurs remains poorly 
understood. The literature focuses on reallocation effects, i.e. how trade induces a shift in output 
from less productive towards more efficient firms (e.g. Melitz, 2003; Melitz and Redding, 2013). 
However, the empirical evidence shows that within incumbent firm productivity growth typically 
accounts for at least as much as these between-firm reallocation effects. This evidence tends to be 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Pavcnik (2002), Trefler (2004) and Dunne, Klimek and Schmitz (2008). 
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indirect since explicit measures of technical change are generally unavailable at the micro-level.2 A 
contribution of paper is to use direct measures of technological upgrading at the firm and plant level 
such as patents and IT. The within firm effects could be due to innovation (firms make products or 
processes that are new to world and shift the global technology frontier) or “compositional” (a firm 
changes its product mix without innovating in this sense). We consider these alternative approaches 
in turn.  
Innovation models have been a mainstay of the theoretical literature for many years.3 
Bloom, Romer, Terry and Van Reenen (2014) show how the Chinese accession to the WTO could 
in theory reduce the opportunity cost of innovating by releasing factors of production “trapped” in 
producing old goods. However, there are several alternative models of how reducing trade barriers 
against low wage country goods could induce Northern innovation. First, lowering import barriers 
increases competitive intensity and such competition could benefit innovation through reducing 
agency costs (e.g. Schmidt, 1997), increasing the incentive to gain market share (Raith, 2002) or 
lowering cannibalization of existing profits.4 However, there is a fundamental Schumpeterian force 
that competition lowers price-cost margins, thereby reducing the quasi-rents from innovation, so the 
effect of competition on innovation incentives is inherently ambiguous (Aghion et al, 2005). A 
second class of innovation models stresses the importance of trade in increasing market size and 
fostering innovation through this market expansion effect.5 Lower trade costs generate a larger 
market size over which to spread the fixed costs of investing in new technologies.6  This works 
through export market expansion into China and we find that industry level variation in exports 
does not primarily drive our results. Third, imports could enhance innovation by enabling domestic 
firms to access better overseas’ knowledge (e.g. Coe and Helpman, 1995 or Acharya and Keller, 
2008). This may occur through the imports of intermediate inputs and supply networks (e.g. 
Goldberg, Khandelwal, Pavcnik and Topalova, 2010a, b).7 These mechanisms do not seem 
                                                 
2 For low-wage countries, Bustos (2011) finds positive effects on innovation from lower export barriers for 
Argentinean firms and Teshima (2008) finds positive effects on process R&D from lower output tariffs for Mexican 
firms. The only study of Southern trade on Northern innovation is Lelarge and Nefussi (2008), who find that the R&D 
of French firms reacts positively to low wage country imports, although they have no external instrument. 
3 Theoretical analysis of trade and innovation is voluminous from the classic work by Grossman and Helpman 
(1991, 1992) to the more recent contributions by Yeaple (2005) and Atkeson and Burstein (2010). 
4 This is the Arrow (1962) “displacement effect”. It shows up in different guises in Aghion et al’s (2005) “escape 
competition” effect and the “switchover costs” of Holmes et al (2008). 
5 Schmookler (1966); Krugman (1980) and Grossman and Helpman (1991, 1992). 
6 Recent work by Lileeva and Trefler (2010) has shown market size effects on Canadian firms of joining NAFTA. 
7 A related literature typically finds that productivity rises when exporting increases (e.g. Verhoogen, 2008). 
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appropriate in the Chinese context however, as European firms have (currently) a large 
technological lead over China.8  
The other main strand of the trade and productivity literature is more focused on 
compositional effects. Consider a framework where we keep the menu of products fixed in the 
economy. When trade barriers fall between the EU/US and China, the high-tech industries will 
grow relatively faster than low-tech industries in the EU/US. The opposite will occur in China. On 
empirical grounds, this simple framework is unsatisfactory, as most of the aggregate changes we 
observe following trade liberalization have occurred within rather than between industries. This 
could be explained, however, by firms operating in more finely disaggregated industries and we will 
show that there are strong reallocation effects whereby low-tech firms tend to shrink and exit 
because of China. Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) show a similar result for US plants using 
proxies for technologies such as capital intensity. 
We report that China induces faster technical change within firms and plants, a finding that 
goes beyond the existing results. In principle, firm TFP increases could be accounted for by two 
factors not strictly related to innovation: changes in a firm’s product portfolio or offshoring. First, 
on product switching, Bernard, Redding and Schott (2010) investigate the impact of trade 
liberalization in heterogeneous multi-product firms. In the face of falling trade costs with a low 
wage country like China, Northern firms shift their product mix towards more high-tech products 
(see Bernard, Redding and Schott, 2007). We investigate this mechanism by examining how plants 
change their product classes, and find evidence for this. Second, a fall in trade costs with China will 
mean that producers of goods that can use Chinese intermediate inputs will benefit. For example, 
firms may slice up the production process and offshore the low-TFP tasks to China (see for example 
Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008). This will have a compositional effect if the remaining 
activities in the home country are more technologically advanced. To investigate this mechanism 
we look explicitly at offshoring to China using a method introduced by Feenstra and Hanson 
(1999). 
Although we will show evidence that both product switching and offshoring are important in 
our data, neither can fully explain our core findings. In particular, a large fraction of the China-
                                                 
8 Eaton and Kortum (2001 and 2002) combine competition, market size and learning in a quantifiable general 
equilibrium trade model. For example, in Eaton and Kortum (2001) a fall in trade costs increases effective market size 
(which encourages innovation) but also increases competition (which discourages innovation). In their baseline model, 
these two forces precisely offset each other so the net effect of trade on innovation is zero. Although the Eaton-Kortum 
framework is powerful, it does not deal easily with one of our key results: that there is a strong effect on innovation for 
incumbent firms in the same sector where trade barriers fell. 
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induced increase in innovation comes from expanding the volume of patents within firms. This 
implies that changing composition can only be part of the story – firms are adding products that are 
new to the world, not simply shifting around product portfolios that already exist in the world.   
Our work is also related to the literature on skill biased technical change. We find a role for 
trade with low wage countries in increasing skill demand (at least since the mid-1990s) through 
inducing technical change.9 The rise of China and other emerging economies such as India, Mexico 
and Brazil has also coincided with an increase in wage inequality and basic trade theory predicts 
such South-North integration could cause this. Despite this, the consensus among most economists 
was that trade was less important than technology in explaining these inequality trends (e.g. Machin 
and Van Reenen, 1998), in part because this work used data up to the mid-1990s, which largely 
predates the rise of China (see Figure 1).10 More recent work (Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2013) finds 
a substantial impact of China in reducing US employment since 2000, particularly among low-
skilled workers. 
 The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II describes the data, Section III details the 
empirical modeling strategy, Section IV describes our results and Section V discusses some 
extensions and robustness tests.  Section VI concludes. 
 
2. DATA 
We combine a number of rich datasets on technical change give an overview here (details in Online 
Appendix A and a replication file available on www. http://www.stanford.edu/~nbloom/TITC.zip). 
Our base dataset is Bureau Van Dijk’s (BVD) Amadeus that contains close to the population of 
public and private firms in 12 European countries.11 Firms in Amadeus have a list of primary and 
secondary four-digit industries which we use to match in the industry level trade data (the average 
firm had two primary codes, but some had as many as 10 primary and 11 secondary codes). In our 
main results we use a weighted average of Chinese imports across all industries that the firm 
                                                 
9 Technological forces also have an effect on trade. For example, better communication technologies facilitate 
offshoring by aiding international coordination. This is another motivation for addressing the endogeneity issue. 
Additionally, there is the direct impact on local employment and welfare (e.g. Autor, Dorn and Hanson, 2014). 
10 In the 1980s China only accounted for about 1% of total imports to the US and EU and by 1991 the figure was 
still only 2%. However, by 2007 China accounted for almost 11% of all imports. Note that Figure 1 may overestimate 
China’s importance, as import growth does not necessarily reflect value added growth. For example, although IPods are 
produced in China, the intellectual property is owned by Apple. However, our identification relies on differences in 
Chinese imports over time and industries, and our results are stronger when we use quota abolition as an instrumental 
variable, so using import value (rather than value added) does not appear to be driving our results. 
11 The 12 countries include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the UK. 
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operates in, but we also present robust results where we allocate the entire firm's output to a single 
industry. 
 
2.1. Patents  
We combined Amadeus with the population of patents applications to the European Patent Office 
(EPO) through matching by name. Patent counts have heterogeneous values so we also use future 
citations to control for patent quality in some specifications. We consider both a baseline sample of 
“patenters” – Amadeus firms filing at least one EPO patent since 1978 – and a wider sample where 
we assume that the firms unmatched to the EPO had zero patents. Patents data is obtained from the 
electronic files of the European Patent Office that began in 1978. We take all the patents that were 
granted to firms and examine the assignee names. We match these to the population of firms in 
Amadeus (i.e. we do not insist that we have any accounting data in Amadeus when doing the 
matching to obtain the maximum match). The matching procedure was based on names and 
location, with details given in Belenzon and Berkovitz (2010). Patents are dated by application year 
to measure the formal invention year of the patent. 
 
2. 2. Productivity and exit 
Amadeus contains accounting information on employment, capital, materials, wage bills and sales. 
We calculate TFP using firms in France, Italy, Spain and Sweden because of their near population 
firm coverage and inclusion of intermediate inputs (materials is not a mandatory accounting item in 
other countries) which is needed to estimate “three-factor” (labor, capital and materials) TFP. We 
estimate TFP in a number of ways, but our core method is to use a version of the Olley Pakes 
(1996) method applied by de Loecker (2011) to allow for trade and imperfect competition with 
multi-product firms. In the first stage, we estimate production functions separately by two digit 
industry across approximately 1.4 million observations to recover the parameters on the factor 
inputs.12 We then estimate TFP and, in the second stage regression relate this to changes in the trade 
environment. As a robustness test we also allowed the production function coefficients to be 
different by country and industry as well as estimated at a finer level of industry aggregation which 
show similar results. Details of this procedure are contained in Online Appendix B.  
                                                 
12  The number of observations in the second stage is smaller than 1.4 million because we are estimating in five-
year differences. Industry specific coefficients on the production function are in Online Table A15. When we used 
lagged TFP on the right hand side of employment or survival regressions we always express it in deviations from the 
industry mean and average between adjacent years to smooth over transitory measurement error. 
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Exit is measured using the Amadeus “status” variable, including extracting this from older 
Amadeus disks where necessary. We define exit as a firm being defined as “bankrupt”, “liquidated” 
or “dormant”. Firms that are taken-over or merged are not counted as exiting since the operations of 
the firm may still be continuing even though ownership has changed.   
 
2.3. Information technology 
Harte Hanks (HH) is a multinational company that collects IT data to sell to large IT firms (e.g. 
IBM, Cisco and Dell). Their data is collected for roughly 160,000 establishments across 20 
European countries, and we restrict attention to the 12 countries for which we are using patents 
data. HH surveys establishments annually on a rolling basis which means it provides a “snapshot” 
of the IT stock. The data contain detailed hardware and software information. We focus on using 
computers per worker (PCs plus laptops) as our main measure of IT intensity because this: (i) is a 
physical quantity measure which is recorded in a consistent way across sites, time and countries, 
and (ii) avoids the use of IT price deflators which are not harmonized across countries. In 
robustness tests we also use alternative measures of IT such as Enterprise Resource Planning 
software, Groupware and Database software (see Online Appendix D).  
 The fact that HH sells this data on to firms who use this for sales and marketing exerts a 
strong discipline on the data quality, as errors would be quickly picked up by clients in their sales 
calls. HH samples all firms with over 100 employees in each country. Thus, we do lose smaller 
firms, but since we focus on manufacturing the majority of employees are in these larger firms, and 
we find no evidence this sampling rule biases our results.13  
 
2.4. UN Comtrade data 
We use trade information from the UN Comtrade data system. This is an international database of 
six-digit product level information on all bilateral imports and exports between any given pairs of 
countries. We aggregate from six-digit product level to four-digit US SIC industry level using the 
                                                 
13  We find no systematic differences in results between firms with 100 to 250 employees and those above 250 
employees, suggesting the selection on firms with over 100 employees is unlikely to cause a major bias. We also find no 
differences in our patenting results – where we have essentially the full population of firms – between firms with less 
than and more than 100 employees. It is also worth noting that large firms account for most of European manufacturing 
employment (and an even larger share of value added), although the precise proportion will vary by country.  For 
example, Firms with over 50 employees account for 82% of total manufacturing employment in Germany, 77% in the 
UK, 76% in Sweden, 72% in Ireland and 69% in France. In Greece this proportion falls to 59%, 56% in Italy and 50% 
in Portugal. See Eurostat Structural Business Statistics, 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/product_details/dataset?p_product_code=SBS_SC_2D_DADE95. 
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Pierce and Schott (2010) concordance. For firms that operate across multiple four digit industries 
we use a weighted average of imports across all sectors in which a firm operates.  
 We use the value of imports originating from China ( ChinaM ) as a share of total world 
imports (
World
M ) in a country by four-digit industry cell as our key measure of exposure to Chinese 
trade, following the “value share” approach outlined by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006); i.e. we 
use /
WorldCH ChinaIMP M M= . As two alternative measures we also construct Chinese import 
penetration by normalizing Chinese imports either on domestic production ( /ChinaM D ) or on 
apparent consumption (domestic production less exports plus imports), /ChinaM C . For domestic 
production we use Eurostat’s Prodcom database. Compared to Comtrade, Prodcom has no data prior 
to 1996, so this restricts the sample period.  An additional problem is that some of the underlying 
six-digit product data is missing (for confidentiality reasons as the industry-country cells are too 
small), so some missing values for domestic production had to be imputed from export data. 
Although we obtain similar results with measures that use production in the denominator (see Table 
1, Panel C), we prefer the normalization on world imports which avoids these data restrictions.  
 
2.5. The Quota Instrument 
Our main strategy to address the endogeneity of imports is to exploit the accession of China to the 
WTO in 2001, which led to the abolition of import quotas on textiles and apparel. European firms in 
these industries generated 31,052 patents in our sample.  
The origin of these quotas dates back to the 1950s when Britain and the US introduced 
quotas in response to import competition from India and Japan. Over time, this quota system was 
expanded to take in most developing countries, and was eventually formalized into the Multi-Fiber 
Agreement (MFA) in 1974. The MFA was itself integrated into GATT in the 1994 Uruguay round, 
and when China joined the WTO in December 2001 these quotas were eliminated in two waves in 
2002 and 2005 (see Brambilla, Khandelwal and Schott, 2010).  
When these quotas were abolished this generated a 240% increase in Chinese imports on 
average within the affected product groups. In fact, this increase in textile and apparel imports was 
so large it led the European Union to re-introduce some limited quotas after 2005.14 Since this re-
                                                 
14  The surge in Chinese imports led to strikes by dockworkers in Southern Europe in sympathy with unions from 
the clothing and textile industry. The Southern European countries with their large clothing and textile sectors lobbied 
the European Union to reintroduce these quotas, while the Northern European countries with their larger retail industries 
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introduction was endogenous, we use the initial level of quotas in 2000 (QUOTAj) as our instrument 
to avoid using the potentially endogenous post-2005 quota levels.  
The exclusion restriction is that shocks to technology are uncorrelated with changes in 
quotas. In our main IV regression we require that the shock to the change in technology 2000-2005 
is uncorrelated with the strength of quotas to non-WTO countries (like China) in 2000. Since, these 
quotas were built up from the 1950s, and their phased abolition negotiated in the late 1980s was in 
preparation for the Uruguay Round this seems like a plausible assumption. For each four-digit 
industry we calculated the proportion of six digit product categories (HS6) that were covered by a 
quota, weighting each product by its share of import value, which varied quasi-randomly across 
four-digit industries. For example, quotas covered 77% of cotton fabric products (SIC 2211) but 
only 2% of wool fabric products (SIC 2231), and covered 100% of women’s dresses (SIC 2334) but 
only 5% of men’s trousers (SIC 2325). This variation presumably reflected the historic bargaining 
power of the various industries in the richer countries in the 1950s and 1960s when these quotas 
were introduced, but are now likely to be uncorrelated to any technology trends in the industries we 
study. We discuss more details of the quota instrument in sub-section IIIA below and in Online 
Appendix B. 
We examine several threats to the exclusion restriction underlying the quota IV. First, we 
confirmed that the industries with the toughest quotas in 2000 had no differential trends in 
observables prior to 2000. The growth of patents, TFP, labor productivity, the capital-labor ratio, 
the material-labor ratio, average wages, total employment and total capital were not significantly 
correlated with the quota instrument.15 As a second tough test we show that our results are robust to 
including firm fixed effects in the differenced equations (i.e. we estimate trend-adjusted difference 
in differences regressions). Thirdly, we present an alternative IV strategy exploiting the initial level 
of Chinese import penetration (an “initial conditions IV described in Section V.B). This has the 
advantage that we can estimate on the entire sample without confining ourselves to the clothing and 
textile sector. 
 
2.6. Descriptive statistics 
                                                                                                                                                                  
fought to keep the quota abolition. Eventually temporary limited quotas were introduced as a compromise, which 
illustrates how the abolition of these quotas was ex ante uncertain, making it harder to pick up anticipation effects.  
15 These correlations are in Online Table A3. High quota industry industries did have lower levels of these 
variables as they are typically low wage, low tech, labour-intensive sectors, but we control for the levels with industry 
fixed effects. 
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The rise of China’s share of all imports to the US and the 12 European countries in our sample is 
remarkable. In 2000 only 5.7% of imports originated in China, but by 2007 this had more than 
doubled to 12.4%. This increase also varies widely across sectors, rising most rapidly in industries 
like toys, furniture and footwear. Some basic descriptive statistics for our main regression samples 
are shown in Online Tables A1 and A2. With the exception of the survival and worst-case bounds 
analyses, the regression samples condition on non-missing values of our key variables over a five 
year period. The exact number of observations (and average firm size) differs between samples. In 
the sample of firms who have patented at least once since 1978 the mean number of patents per year 
is one and median employment is 100. When we condition the regressions on the TFP sample 
median employment in 30 (reflecting the fact that patenting firms are larger than average). For 
plants with IT data, median employment is 140 (reflecting the Harte-Hanks’ sampling frame as 
discussed above) and the average IT intensity is 0.58 computers per worker.   
 
3. EMPIRICAL MODELING STRATEGY  
Our empirical models analyze both the within firm intensive margin of technological upgrading and 
the between firm extensive margin of upgrading through selection effects.  
 
3.1. Technical change within surviving plants and firms 
Consider a basic firm-level equation for the level of technology (TECH) in firm i in industry j in 
country k at time t as: 
ln CHijkt jkt l i kt ijktTECH IMP fα η ε−= + + +                                               (1) 
TECH will be interpreted broadly and measured using a number of indicators such as patented 
innovations16, IT and TFP. We measure CHjktIMP  mainly as the proportion of imports (M) in industry 
j and country k that originate from China )/(
World
jk
China
jk MM , the ktf  are a full set of country dummies 
interacted with time dummies to absorb macro-economic shocks and iη  is a firm fixed effect. The 
trade-induced technical change hypothesis is that α > 0. Note that we allow for a dynamic response 
in equation (1) depending on the lag length indicator l. Our baseline results will use l = 0 to be 
                                                 
16  Because of the zeros in patents when taking logarithms we use the transformation PATENTS = 1 + PAT where 
PAT is the count of patents. The addition of unity is arbitrary, but equal to the sample mean of patents. We also compare 
the results with fixed effect Negative Binomial count data models below which generated similar results (see Table 7). 
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consistent across all equations, but we check the robustness of the results when using alternative lag 
lengths.17 
To sweep out firm fixed effects we estimate:: 
ln CHijkt jkt kt ijktTECH IMP fα εΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ                                       (2) 
Where Δ  denotes the long (usually five year) difference operator. Rapid growth in the 
Chinese import share is therefore used as a proxy for a rapid increase in trade competition from low 
wage countries. We maximize the use of the data by using overlapping five-year differences (e.g. 
2005-2000 and 2004-1999) but since we cluster at the country-industry pair level (or sometimes just 
industry level) this is innocuous. We report some results using non-overlapping five-year 
differences and specifications in levels (e.g. fixed effect Negative Binomial models). 
The growth of Chinese imports may still be related to unobserved shocks, ijktεΔ so we 
consider instrumental variables such as the removal of quotas when China joined the WTO to 
evaluate potential endogeneity biases. The first stage of the model can be written as: 
CH Q Q
jkt jkt kt ijktIMP QUOTA fϕ εΔ = − Δ + Δ + Δ  
where jktQUOTA  is the toughness of the quota as measured by the (value-weighted) proportion of 
products in the industry that are covered by a quota against China. We expect that ϕ >0, i.e. the 
tougher the quotas the less imports that there will be from China. Consider the 2005 to 2000 long 
difference. Since quotas were abolished by 2005, ,00
CH Q Q
jkt jk kt ijktIMP QUOTA fϕ εΔ = + Δ + Δ .  In other 
words, the tougher the industry’s quotas against China in 2000, the faster we would expect imports 
to grow in the subsequent five years. Note that we can write the reduced form for innovation as: 
,00ln ijkt jk kt ijktTECH QUOTA eπ ςΔ = + Δ + Δ  
To address the concern that there may be pre-trends in the growth of technology in those industries 
where quotas were toughest, we can allow for firm specific trends.  
 
3.2. Technological upgrading through reallocation between plants and firms 
In addition to examining whether Chinese import competition causes technological upgrading 
within firms we also examine whether trade affects innovation by reallocating economic activity 
between firms by examining employment and survival equations. As discussed in the Introduction, 
                                                 
17  For patents, the largest effects appear after three years (see Online Table A14) which is consistent with the idea 
that most firms take a few years to obtain innovations from their increased R&D spending.  
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compositional models would predict that China would cause low-tech plants to shrink and die, as 
they are competing most closely with Chinese imports. Consequently, we estimate firm 
employment growth equations of the form:  
5 5ln ( * )
N CH N CH N N N
ijkt jkt ijkt jkt ijkt kt ijktN IMP TECH IMP TECH fα γ δ ε− −Δ = Δ + Δ + + Δ + Δ          (3) 
where N = employment and the coefficient Nα  reflects the association of jobs growth with the 
change in Chinese imports, which we would expect to be negative (i.e. Nα < 0) and TECH is the 
relevant technology variable (e.g. patenting). We are particularly interested in whether Chinese 
import competition has a larger effect on low-tech firms, so to capture this we include the 
interaction of 
CH
jktIMPΔ  with the (lagged) technology variables. If Chinese trade has a 
disproportionately negative effect on low-tech firms we would expect Nγ  > 0.  
 Equations (2) and (3) are estimated on surviving firms. However, one of the effects of 
Chinese trade may be to reduce the probability of plant survival. Consequently, we also estimate: 
5 5( * )
S CH S CH S S S
ijkt ijkt jkt ijkt jkt ijkt kt ijktSURVIVAL S IMP TECH IMP TECH fα γ δ ε− −= = Δ + Δ + + Δ + Δ          (4) 
which is defined on a cohort of firms (or establishments) who were alive in a base period and 
followed over the next five years. If these establishments (or firms) survived over the subsequent 
five years we define ijktS = 1 and zero otherwise. If Chinese imports do reduce survival probabilities, 
we expect Sα  < 0 and if high-tech plants are more protected we expect Sγ > 0.  
 When we implement the quota IV strategy in the employment and survival equations there 
are two endogenous variables: CHjktIMPΔ  and 5 *
CH
ijkt jktTECH IMP− Δ . Hence we use ,00jkQUOTA  and 
,00 5*jk ijktQUOTA TECH −  as two instruments in each first stage. 
 To complete the analysis of between firm effects we would also need an entry equation. The 
fundamental problem is that there is no “initial” technology level for entering firms. We cannot use 
the current observed technology level ( ijktTECH ) as this is endogenous. We can address the issue of 
entry indirectly, however, by estimating an industry-level version of equation (2):  
IND CH IND IND
jkt jkt kt jktTECH IMP fα εΔ = Δ + Δ + Δ                                                (5) 
where the coefficient on Chinese imports, INDα , in equation (5) reflects the combination of within 
firm effects from equations (1) and (2), the reallocation effects from equations (3) and (4), and the 
unmodelled entry effects. In examining the magnitude of the Chinese trade effects, we will simulate 
the proportion of aggregate technical change that can be accounted for by Chinese imports using 
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equations (2)-(4) and break this down into within and between components. We will also compare 
the micro and industry estimates of equation (5) which give an alternative estimate of the within and 
between effects, including entry.  
 
3.3. Sample size across regressions 
In the results that follow in the next section we generally use the largest possible sample of non-
missing observations. Sample sizes differ between columns within a Table primarily because of 
different samples for the three technology variables due to missing data (Online Appendix A.3 gives 
full details, but broadly the sample is restricted because we drop firms who never patent when we 
run the patenting equation). Just about all firms have IT, but Harte-Hanks only surveys larger firms 
and only from 2000. We have, in principle, the largest sample for TFP, but accounting data 
(especially for materials) is only reliable in four of our twelve European countries. Samples also 
change when we move from pooling across all industries (e.g. Table 1) to focusing on just the 
clothing and textile sector (e.g. Table 2). We note other specific sample changes in the text and in 
table notes. 
 
4. RESULTS 
4.1. Within firm results: OLS estimates 
Table 1 presents our core results: within firm measures of technical change. All columns control for 
fixed effects by estimating in long-differences and country-specific macro shocks by including a 
full set of country dummies interacted with a full set of time dummies. Our key measure of 
innovation, patents, is the dependent variable in column (1). The coefficient suggests that a 10 
percentage point increase in Chinese import penetration is associated with a 3.2% increase in 
patenting. Since jobs fell in those industries affected by Chinese imports we underestimate the 
growth in patent intensity (patents per worker) by not controlling for (endogenous) employment. If 
we also include the growth of employment in column (1), the coefficient (standard error) on imports 
is slightly larger at 0.387 (0.134).18  
 
                                                 
18  The coefficient (standard error) on employment in the patents equation was 0.015(0.008) implying that larger 
firms have a higher volume of patents. If we include the ln(capital/sales) ratio as well as ln(employment) in the 
regression this barely shifts the results (the coefficient on Chinese imports is 0.370 with a standard error of 0.125). 
Thus, the correlation with Chinese trade is not simply an increase in all types of capital, but seems related specifically to 
technical change. The other results in Table 1 are also robust to controlling for employment growth. 
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TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
A concern with patenting as an innovation indicator is that firms may simply be taking out 
more patents to protect their existing knowledge in the face of greater Chinese competition. To test 
this “lawyer effect” we also look at citations per patent – if firms are now patenting more 
incremental knowledge for fear of being copied by the Chinese, the average quality of their patents 
should fall, so citations per patent should drop. In fact, the coefficient on Chinese imports is positive 
(although insignificant).19  
 In column (2) of Table 1, we examine IT intensity and again find a positive and significant 
coefficient on Chinese imports. We use computers per employee as our main measure of IT 
diffusion as this is a good indicator of a general-purpose technology used widely across industries.  
However, we also investigate other measures of IT – the adoption of Enterprise Resource Planning, 
database software, and groupware tools – and also find positive effects of Chinese imports.20 
Finally, in column (3) we use a wider measure of technical change as the dependent variable, TFP 
growth, and again establish a positive and significant association with Chinese imports.21 Other 
measures of productivity enhancing investment such as the growth of R&D expenditures and 
management quality are also positively associated with increased exposure to Chinese imports.22  
 
4.2. Within Firm Results: Robustness of OLS estimates 
We subjected the baseline results to a number of robustness checks. First, we were concerned that 
unobserved productivity shocks could be driving the positive correlation so in Panel B we include a 
full set of three-digit industry dummies in the growth specifications. Although the magnitude of the 
coefficient on Chinese imports is smaller in all cases, it remains significant at the 10% level or 
greater across all three specifications. Note that the industry trends are jointly insignificant in all 
                                                 
19  For example, when we estimate a specification like column (1) of Table 1 except using cites per patent as the 
dependent variable, the coefficient on Chinese imports is 0.009 with a standard error of 0.029. 
20  Online Appendix E also investigates non-linearities through examining quintiles of the growth of Chinese 
imports as well as linear effects on these types of software. 
21  Note that our pooling across multiple overlapping years to construct five-year differences is largely innocuous 
as we are clustering the standard errors by country-industry pair. For example if we use only the last five year difference 
the qualitative results are similar. In this experiment the coefficient (standard error) is 0.591(0.201) for patents; 
0.314(0.077) for IT; and 0.400 (0.079) for TFP. 
22  The coefficient (standard error) on Chinese imports was 1.213(0.549) in the R&D equation. See Bloom, Sadun 
and Van Reenen (2015) for analysis of management (defined as in Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). 
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three cases. It is unsurprising that the coefficient falls as we are effectively switching off much of 
the useful variation and exacerbating any attenuation bias.23  
 Second, we normalized Chinese imports by a measure of domestic activity such as 
production or apparent consumption instead of total imports in Panel C. Although the magnitude of 
the coefficients changes as the mean of the imports variable is different, the qualitative and 
quantitative results are remarkably similar.24  
In addition to China’s effect through competition in the final goods market, the opening up 
of China could have affected technical progress by allowing Western firms to buy cheaper 
intermediate inputs and offshore low value added parts of the production chain.25 We investigate 
this by adapting the offshoring measure of Feenstra and Hanson (1999) for China, which uses the 
input-output tables to measure for each industry the share of Chinese inputs in total imported 
inputs.26 In Panel D, we find offshoring enters with a positive coefficient in all three equations 
(although insignificantly so in the patents equation). The share of Chinese imports in the final goods 
market (our baseline measure) remains positive and significant throughout with only slightly lower 
coefficients.27 This suggests that while offshoring does not increase overall innovation (as 
measured by patents) it does increase IT intensity and productivity, presumably since offshoring 
moves the less IT intensive and lower productivity parts of the production process overseas to 
China.  
 
 
4.3. Within Firm Results: Using China’s WTO accession to generate Instrumental Variables  
                                                 
23  If we include four digit industry trends the coefficient (standard errors) in the patent, IT and TFP regressions 
are 0.185(0.125), 0.170(0.082) and 0.232(0.064). If we include three digit dummies interacted with country dummies 
the results are 0.274(0.101), 0.176(0.080) and 0.167(0.052). Hence, the primary source of identification is (i) multi-
product firms who face differential industry effects in addition to their primary sector and (ii) the acceleration of import 
growth and technology. The continued importance of the trade variable even after this tough test is remarkable. 
24  For example, a one standard deviation increase in the import share in Table 1, Panel A column (1) is associated 
with a 10% increase in patenting. By contrast, a one standard deviation increase in the import share in column (1) of 
Panel B in is associated with a 14% increase in patenting.  
25  Intermediate inputs are stressed (in a developing country context) by Amiti and Konings (2006) and Goldberg 
et al, 2010b).  
26  See Online Appendix A for details. We also considered the share of total imported inputs in all inputs (or all 
costs) like Feenstra-Hanson, but as with our analysis of total imports in the final goods market, it is the Chinese share 
(reflecting low wage country inputs) that is the dominant explanatory factor. 
27  The coefficient estimates imply a one standard deviation increase in offshoring has a similar marginal effect on 
IT and TFP  (0.014 and 0.008 respectively) to a one standard deviation increase in Chinese imports (0.015 and 0.006 
respectively). 
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 An obvious problem with estimating these equations is the potential endogeneity of Chinese 
imports due to unobserved technology shocks correlated with the growth of Chinese imports. For 
example, when a domestic industry is subject to a positive technology shock it is harder for foreign 
exporters to compete in the same market, especially low-skill, low-tech exporters like China.  This 
is most likely to cause a downward bias on the OLS estimates of the effects of China on technology, 
as more exogenous innovation will lead to fewer Chinese imports (China is still a relatively low-
tech, low skilled country compared to Europe). Nevertheless, there could be demand side shocks 
working in the opposite direction, however, so ultimately the direction of the OLS bias is an 
empirical question.  
Table 2 presents the IV results using China’s WTO accession.28 Since this is only relevant 
for textiles and clothing, we first present the OLS results for these sectors for all the technology 
indicators in columns (1), (4) and (7). In column (1), there is a large positive and significant 
coefficient on the Chinese trade variable, reflecting the greater importance of low wage country 
trade in this sector. Column (2) presents the first stage using the (value-weighted) proportion of 
products covered by quotas in 2000. Quota removal appears to be positively and significantly 
related to the future growth of Chinese imports. Column (3) presents the IV results that show a 
significant effect of Chinese imports on patents with a higher coefficient than OLS (1.86 compared 
to 1.16). 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
  
 Columns (4)-(6) of Table 2 repeat the specification but uses IT intensity instead of patents as 
the dependent variable. Column (4) shows that the OLS results for IT are also strong in this sector 
and column (5) reports that the instrument has power in the first stage. The IV results in column (6) 
also indicate that the OLS coefficient appears downward biased.29 The final three columns repeat 
                                                 
28  In Table 2 we cluster by four-digit industry as the instruments have no country-specific variation. We also drop 
years after 2005 so the latest long difference (2005-2000) covers the years before and after China joined the WTO. Note 
that we include all firms who have any “primary” industry presence in textiles and clothing according to BVD. The 
main industry of some of these firms will be outside textiles, hence the large number of clusters. If we condition on only 
those firms whose main industry is textiles the results are robust (e.g. the coefficient on Chinese imports in column (3) 
is 2.010 with a standard error of 1.074). 
29  If we repeat the IV specification of column (6) but also condition on employment growth the coefficient on 
Chinese imports is 0.687 with a standard error of 0.373. Dropping all the four-digit sectors that had a zero quota in 2000 
uses only the continuous variation in quotas among the affected industries to identify the Chinese import effect. 
Although this regression sample has only 766 observations, this produces a coefficient (standard error) under the IV 
specification of 2.688(1.400) compared to an OLS estimate of 1.238(0.245). 
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the specification for TFP showing similar results to patents and IT. So overall, there is a large OLS 
coefficient for patents, IT and TFP, but an even larger IV coefficient and certainly no evidence of 
upward bias for OLS.30  
 The major concern with the IV strategy is that there could be some unobserved trend in the 
sectors that had the highest quotas that meant they would have had faster technical change even in 
the absence of China joining the WTO. To examine this potential bias we subject the results to a 
tough test of including firm-specific trends.31 If these firms were more likely to innovate in the high 
quota industries then we would expect to see our effects disappear when we condition on these 
firm-specific trends. We use the reduced forms for a longer time period covering pre and post WTO 
accession to capture the trend. Hence, we estimate: 
ln ijkt jkt ijk kt ijktTECH z eπ η ςΔ = Δ + + Δ + Δ  
where ,00 * I( 2001)jkt jkz QUOTA YEARΔ = ≥ , remains the “toughness” of the quotas in 2000, but we 
make explicit that we are interacting this with a “policy on” dummy for the post WTO period 
( I( 2001)YEAR ≥ ). Note that for IT we do not have any data pre-WTO accession so we can only 
present results for patents and TFP. The ijkη  are a full set of firm fixed effects that pick up trends as 
the equation is estimated in long-differences. 
In column (1) of Table 3, we show that the firms more subject to quota removal had 
significantly higher rates of patenting after Chinese WTO accession. In column (2) we add the firm 
dummies to the growth specifications. The coefficient on Chinese imports actually increases, 
although the change is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.477). An alternative way to define 
exposure to the policy is to count the number of years since the 2001 accession instead of a simple 
binary dummy. Using this alternative measure in columns (3) and (4) produces qualitatively similar 
results to the first two columns. The final four columns (5) to (8) reproduce these four specifications 
but using TFP as the outcome. Again, the results with and without firm specific trends are similar. 
So overall, we find that the results are robust to controlling for longer-run trends in technical 
change.32  
                                                 
30  The Hausman tests fail to reject the null of the exogeneity of Chinese imports for the patents and IT equations, 
but does reject for the TFP equation (p-values of 0.342, 0.155 and 0.001 respectively). 
31  Note that the quotas are firm-specific as many of our firms are multi-product so operate across several 
industries and face a firm-specific weighted average quota (see Appendices A and B). 
32 We focus on the reduced form for reasons of transparency. We also estimated IV versions of these trend-
adjusted difference in difference regressions and also found that the coefficients on Chinese imports tended to be higher 
than in the simpler IV counterparts. However, the instruments in the first stages were weak with F-statistics generally 
below 10. 
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TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Do firms adjust their innovation behavior in in anticipation of China joining the WTO? 
There was a large element of surprise in the impact of quota abolition because at the time there was 
considerable uncertainty over whether the liberalization would actually take place. A common view 
was that even if there was an abolition of quotas this would be temporary, as to some extent it was 
with the temporary reintroduction of some quotas in 2006. The fact that Table 3 finds a break in the 
trend of innovation in 2001 in those industries where the fall in quotas was greatest shows there was 
a change in behavior, over and above any pre-policy anticipation effects. A concern might be that 
firms delayed their normal innovations pre-accession in those sectors likely to be most affected by 
quota abolition causing us to infer a spurious positive effect of liberalization. We performed two 
tests of this idea. First, we examined whether innovation was significantly slower for firms more 
affected by quota abolition by regressing the five-year growth in innovation in the years prior to 
2001 on the quota instrument: the coefficients were always insignificant.33  Secondly, we ran the 
regressions in Table 3 columns (1), (3) and (4) conditioning on the lagged growth in innovation. So 
when examining the growth in patents 2005-2000 we control for the growth in patents 2000-1995, 
conditioning out any “anticipation effects”. We still recovered a significant and positive effect of 
quota abolition on innovation (details are discussed in Online Appendix F).  
We also investigated using the WTO quasi-experiment of Table 2 to construct “input 
quotas” using the input-output tables to calculate predicted falls in the barriers to using Chinese 
inputs. Looking at the reduced forms for the technology equations (i.e. simply regressing the five-
year growth of each technology measure on input quotas and country dummies interacted with time 
dummies), removal of input quotas had no significant impact on patents, but significantly increased 
IT intensity and TFP. When output quotas were also included in this specification, input quotas 
remained significant at the 5% level for the TFP equation, but were only significant at the 10% level 
for the IT equation. Output quotas remained positive and significant in all three specifications.34  
                                                 
33  If we regress the growth of patents 2000-1995 on the quota instrument (in 2000) the coefficient (standard error) 
on quotas is -0.068(0.052). By contrast, the standard reduced form for patent growth 2005-2000 has a coefficient on 
quotas of 0.264(0.088). Similarly the regression of the pre-WTO growth of TFP 2000-1995 on the quota IV has a 
coefficient (standard error) of -0.010(0.040) whereas the standard reduced form for TFP 2005-2000 has a coefficient on 
quotas (standard error) of 0.190(0.021). 
34 These are from reduced form models including input and output quotas simultaneously. The coefficients 
(standard errors) on input quotas were 0.727(0.523), 0.696(0.365) and 0.290(0.136) in the patents, IT and TFP 
 at Stanford U
niversity on February 9, 2016
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
19 
  
Taking Tables 2 and 3 together, there is no evidence that we are over-estimating the effects 
of China on technical change in the OLS estimates in Table 1. If anything, we may be too 
conservative.35  
   
4.4. Between Firm Results: jobs and survival 
Table 4 examines reallocation effects by analyzing employment growth in Panel A and survival in 
Panel B. The sample size is smaller for the survival analysis because we focus on the cohort alive in 
2000 where we have reliable data for exit to bankruptcy by 2005. Sample sizes are identical for 
columns (3)-(6) as Table 1, but are smaller in columns (1) and (2) because there are some missing 
values on employment in our patents sample. We first examine the basic associations in column (1) 
of Panel A, which suggests a strong negative effect of Chinese imports - a 10 percentage point 
increase in imports is associated with a 3.6% fall in employment. Like Autor, Dorn and Hanson 
(2013) this suggests Chinese imports are associated with falling levels of manufacturing 
employment. In addition, high-tech firms (as indicated by a high level of lagged patents per worker) 
were more likely to grow. Most importantly, the interaction of Chinese trade and lagged patent 
stock enters with a positive and significant coefficient in column (2). This suggests that more high-
tech firms are somewhat “shielded” from the harmful effects of Chinese imports on jobs.36 In 
columns (3) to (6) we run similar employment estimations using the initial level of IT and TFP and 
again find similar positive and significant interaction terms, suggesting high-tech firms are 
somewhat protected from the effects of Chinese import competition.37 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
equations. The coefficients (standard errors) for the output quotas were: 0.201 (0.080), 0.160 (0.046), and 0.101 (0.019). 
We estimate these equations on industries where at least 0.5% of imported inputs are from China. 
35  The downward bias on OLS of trade variables is also found in Auer and Fisher (2010) who examine the impact 
of trade with less developed countries on prices. They use a variant of an initial conditions estimator based on the 
industry's labor intensity. Like them, we also find important import effects on prices (see sub-section VI.B).  
36  This result is not driven by the inclusion of employment in our patent stock measure on the right hand side. To 
test this we estimated both a model where employment was removed from the denominator (that is, a simple patent 
stock measure) and a model that also included lagged employment and its interaction with Chinese imports. The 
estimate of our imports growth and lagged technology interaction terms for these models were 0.192(0.086) and 
0.160(0.083) respectively.  
37 We also examined including firm specific trends in these regressions. The interaction between Chinese import 
growth and lagged technology remained positive although the standard errors rise a lot. The coefficient (standard error) 
in the equivalent of column (2) for patents was 0.182(1.110), in column (4) for IT was 0.377(0.324) and in column (6) 
for TFP was 0.556(0.268). 
 at Stanford U
niversity on February 9, 2016
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
20 
  
We also examined the dynamic effects of Chinese imports on employment and technology. 
Chinese imports appear to have the largest impact on patents after three years whereas for jobs the 
largest impact for Chinese imports is contemporaneously. This is consistent with the idea that firms 
respond to Chinese imports by cutting employment and starting innovation projects, but it takes 
around three years for these projects to create patentable innovations. 
 For the survival equations in Panel B of Table 4 we consider a cohort of firms and plants 
alive in 2000 and model the probability that they survived until 2005 as a function of the growth of 
industry-wide Chinese imports and the initial technology levels. Column (1) shows firms facing 
higher rates of Chinese import growth are less likely to survive: a ten percentage point increase in 
Chinese imports is associated with a decrease in the survival probability of 0.57 percentage points. 
Since the mean exit rate is 2.3% (a relatively rare event in our patenters sample which may help 
explain the insignificance of the linear imports coefficient), this represents about a 25% increase in 
exit rates. Column (2) analyzes the interaction term between Chinese import growth and lagged 
patents and finds again a positive “shielding” effect: firms with a low initial patent stock have a 
significantly higher change of exiting when faced by an influx of Chinese imports.38 Columns (3) to 
(6) shows that there are also positive interaction effects when we use IT or TFP as alternative 
measures of technology.39 These findings on the impact of low wage country imports on 
reallocation is consistent with those found in US manufacturing establishments in Bernard, Jensen 
and Schott (2006) using indirect measures of technology (capital intensity and skills) for the pre-
1997 period in the US.40 
 Table 5 looks at the between firm reallocation effects when we use Chinese WTO accession 
as an IV. Column (1) of Panel A shows that the higher tech firms appear to be somewhat protected 
from Chinese imports, just as we found in the larger sample. In the IV results in column (2) the 
                                                 
38  Note the sample in columns (1) and (2) is the same as in other patent samples, i.e. those firms that patented at 
some point since 1978. We obtain similar results if we widened the same to include all firms, even those who had never 
patented. The coefficient (standard error) on the interaction term between initial technology and Chinese import growth 
was 1.546(0.134) for employment growth and 0.391(0.180) for survival. 
39  Further investigation reveals that the main interaction effect is coming from firms in the bottom quintile of the 
technology distribution who were significantly more likely to exit because of Chinese import competition. For example, 
estimating column (3) but using a dummy for the lowest quintile of the IT intensity distribution rather than the linear IT 
intensity gave a coefficient (standard error) of 0.214 (0.102) on the interaction. 
40 We also experimented with including average firm wages (as a skill proxy) and capital-labor ratio (both 
interacted with Chinese import growth) in the employment regressions. These additional interaction terms were 
insignificant when the patents variables were also included, but the technology interactions remained positive and 
significant. For example, when these additional interactions with wages and capital (as well as the linear terms)  were 
added to the specification in Table 4, Panel A column (2), the coefficient (standard error) on the interaction between 
Chinese import growth and lagged patents was 1.509(0.660). 
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standard error rises on the interaction, but the coefficient is largely unchanged (3.3 compared to 3.7 
in column (1)). Columns (3) and (4) implement the same approach but use lagged IT intensity as the 
technology measure instead of lagged patents. In these specifications, the IV results look even 
stronger than OLS with the interaction remaining significant at the 5% level. The last two columns 
repeat the exercise for TFP and, like IT, we find the coefficient on the interaction between Chinese 
imports growth and lagged technology is larger in IV than OLS (albeit with a larger standard error). 
Panel B of Table 5 repeats the specifications using survival as the outcome. The pattern is broadly 
similar with the coefficients on the key interaction term all being positive (except column (4)). The 
coefficients are much less precisely determined, however, with all interaction coefficients 
insignificant in the IV specifications.  
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
It is worth remembering that the specifications in Table 5 are demanding. The sample is 
smaller than Table 4 (just clothing and textile industries) and we are instrumenting both the linear 
effect (as in Table 2) and the interaction. The absolute number of exits is also low (e.g. only 37 
incidences in Panel B column (1)). Despite this, the overall qualitative similarity of the IV results 
compared to OLS is reassuring. 
 
4.5. Magnitudes  
Taking all these results together we have a clear empirical picture of the role of Chinese imports in 
increasing technological intensity both within firms (Tables 1 through 3) and between firms by 
reallocating output to more technologically advanced firms (Tables 4 and 5). So a natural question 
is how large are these effects on an economy level? As Atkeson and Burstein (2010), Arkolakis, 
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2010) and Ossa and Hsieh (2010) have stressed, when examining 
general equilibrium results we have to take into account a range of broader impacts. Nevertheless, 
we can use the regression coefficients to perform partial equilibrium calculations to get rough 
magnitudes for the potential importance of China in shaping technical change.  
To run our magnitude calculations we use a standard productivity decomposition following 
papers like Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (2000), to decompose aggregate increases in 
productivity into a within firm term and between firm reallocation term. Formally, denoting Pt as an 
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aggregate index of technology in a country, for example patents or TFP, the change in Pt between 
time t and time 0 can be decomposed as follows: 
 
0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1
0
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
N N N
t i ijt ijo it i ij it i ijt ij
i i i
exit exit entrant entrant
it ij jo it ijt jt
i exit i entrant
P s p p s s p s s p p
s p p s p p
= = =
∈ ∈
Δ = − + − + − −
− − + −
  
 
                (6) 
where sit = firm share of total employment, pijt = firm technology level, jtp = average technology 
level of all firms, 0
exit
ijp  and 
entrant
ijtp  are the technology levels of exiters and entrants respectively, and 
the summations is over all N firms in the economy. In equation (6) the first term is the within effect 
(the increase in technology holding firm size constant), the second term is the between component 
(the increase in aggregate technology from shifting employment from low-tech firms towards high-
tech firms), the third term is the cross effect (the correlation of the increase in technology within 
firms and their change in employment share).41 The fourth term is the exit component (the impact of 
the relative technology level of exiting firms versus incumbent firms) and the final term the entry 
component (the impact of technology level of entering firms versus incumbent firms). We cannot 
directly calculate the entry component (as the pre-entry technology level of an entrants is 
unobservable), but we can indirectly examine the effect of entry by comparing the industry level 
estimates to the four components we can identify. To calculate the decomposition in equation (6) 
we used the parameter values from Table 1 panel A and Table 4 columns (2), (4) and (6). 
As shown in Table 6 (with details in Online Appendix D) we estimate that over the 2000-
2007 period Chinese imports accounted for 13.9% of the increase in aggregate patenting per 
worker, and approximately 13.5% each for IT intensity and TFP growth. Decomposing these we 
find for patents the within firm component is 5.1%, the between effect is 6.7% with the rest due to 
exit (2.1%). For IT and productivity, the within component is larger (9.8% and 9.9% respectively). 
We also re-calculated the magnitudes including the offshoring coefficients from Table 1 panel D 
which includes offshoring. Although the overall effects on patents are not much changed, the 
implied effects of China on aggregate IT and TFP more than double. We can also use the IV 
coefficients from Tables 2 and 5, and find that the impact of Chinese import competition is much 
                                                 
41 Following the convention, we will aggregate the cross effect with the between effect when presenting results, 
but in practice this makes little difference as the cross-term is always small. 
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larger.42 Hence, this implies that if anything, our baseline figures are underestimating the effect of 
China. 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
Finally, an alternative approach to gauging the magnitude of the within and between firm 
effect of China is to compare estimates at the industry level and at the firm level. The industry level 
magnitudes capture both effects while the firm level magnitudes capture only the within effects. In 
addition to being a cross check on the magnitudes as estimated from the full set of equations, the 
industry-level estimates include any effect of China on entry.43 For example, if Chinese competition 
discourages entry of innovative firms within an industry, then the magnitude calculations will over-
estimate the impact of trade on technical change. By contrast, the industry level aggregates are the 
stock of firms so include all growth from entrants as well as survivors. We find results that are very 
consistent with the earlier calculations - the industry coefficients are all significant and about twice 
as large as the firm level coefficients for patents and TFP (and about a tenth larger for IT).44   
 
5. EXTENSIONS AND ROBUSTNESS 
5.1. Dynamic Selection bias  
A concern with our finding of positive effects of Chinese imports competition on within firm 
technical change is that it reflects dynamic selection bias. For example, it may be that firms who 
know that they are technologically improving are less likely to exit in the face of the Chinese import 
shock. This could generate our positive coefficients in Table 1. Note that our industry-level results 
discussed in the previous sub-section are robust to this problem because they aggregate innovation. 
Dynamic selection bias would mean, however, that we attribute too much of this aggregate industry 
effect to the within firm component and too little to the reallocation component in the magnitude 
calculations.  
                                                 
42 See Online Table A6. About half of the increase in aggregate magnitudes is because the coefficients are larger 
in textiles than the overall sample and half is due to the IV coefficients being larger than the OLS coefficients. 
43  Atkeson and Burstein (2010) stress this as one of the main problems with firm-level analysis of trade. 
44  See Online Table A5. In summary, for patents, the coefficient was 0.368 at the industry level compared to 
0.171 at the firm level. For TFP the coefficients were 0.326 vs. 0.262 and for IT they were 0.399 vs. 0.361. The firm 
coefficients differ slightly from Table 1 because we allocate firms to one four-digit industry (for comparability to the 
industry results). 
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 We can place an upper bound on the magnitude of the dynamic selection effects by 
exploiting the fact that the number of patents can never fall below zero (Online Appendix F has the 
formal statement of this). We create pseudo observations for firms who exit and give them a value 
of zero patents for all post exit periods until the end of the sample in 2005. This is a “worst case 
bounds” bounds approach (see Manski and Pepper, 2000 or Blundell et al, 2007) as the effect of 
trade could never be less than this lower bound.  
 Table 7 implements this bounds method.45 We first report the baseline results of Panel A of 
Table 1 column (1) and then report the results for the worst-case lower bounds in column (2). Note 
that as well as additional observations on our surviving 8,480 firms we also obtain additional firms 
as we now can construct a five-year difference even for firms with less than five years of actual 
patenting data by giving them zeros for the years after they exit. Dropping firms with less than five 
years of data is another possible source of selection bias that is addressed by this method.46 Our 
results appear to be robust to these potential selection bias problems as the coefficient on Chinese 
imports in column (2) remains positive and significant and has fallen only by less than one-sixth, 
from 0.321 to 0.271. 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
Since patents are counts we also consider a Negative Binomial model. It is less 
straightforward to deal with fixed effects in such models than in our baseline long-differences 
models, especially with weakly exogenous variables like Chinese imports (e.g. the Hausman, Hall 
and Griliches, 1984, fixed effect Negative Binomial model requires strict exogeneity). We use the 
Blundell et al (1999) method of controlling for fixed effects through pre-sample mean scaling for 
the baseline model. This estimator has proven attractive in the context of patent models and exploits 
the long pre-sample history of patents to control for the fixed effect (we have up to 23 years of pre-
sample patent data). 
                                                 
45 This worse case bounds approach cannot be implemented for the TFP equation as it does not have a lower 
bound of zero. 
46  A total of 658 firms with some history of patenting exited to bankruptcy in our sample. 406 of these were 
already in the main sample of 8,480 firms and 30,277 observations (Table 1, column (1)). The additional 252 of the 658 
exiting firms were outside the main sample because they reported less than five consecutive observations so that a five-
year difference in patenting could not be defined. The increase in observations from 30,277 in column (1) to 31,272 in 
column (2) are the additional observations on these 658 exiting firms. 
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Column (3) of Table 7 implements the Negative Binomial model and shows that the 
coefficient on imports is similar to the baseline results with a positive and significant coefficient 
that is if anything slightly higher than the long differenced results. Column (4) shows that the worst-
case lower bounds are again not much lower than the baseline, with the effect falling only slightly 
from 0.398 to 0.395.47 We conclude from Table 7 that the dynamic selection problem is not causing 
us to substantially overestimate the impact of Chinese competition on within firm increases in 
innovation. 
   
5.2. Initial conditions as instrumental variables  
A disadvantage of the quota-based instrument is that we can only construct the instrument for the 
affected industries (textiles and clothing), so we consider a second identification strategy. The 
overall increase in Chinese imports is driven by the exogenous liberalization being pursued by 
Chinese policy makers. The industries where China exports grew more depended on whether the 
industry is one in which China had a comparative advantage. For example, if we consider the 
growth of Chinese imports in Europe between 2000 and 2005, sectors in which China was already 
exporting strongly in 1999 are likely to be those where China had a comparative advantage – such 
as textiles, furniture and toys – and are also the sectors which experienced much more rapid 
increase in import penetration in the subsequent years. Consequently, high exposure to Chinese 
imports in 1999 can potentially be used (interacted with the exogenous overall growth of Chinese 
imports, ChinaMΔ ) as a potential instrument for subsequent Chinese import growth. In other words 
we use ( 6 *
CH China
jt tIMP M− Δ ) as an instrument for 
CH
jktIMPΔ  where 6
CH
jtIMP −  is the Chinese import share 
in industry j in the EU and US.48  
Using this initial conditions IV strategy generated similar qualitative results to the quota 
instrument as shown in Table 8. Panel A has the within-firm technology results. The first stage is 
very strong in all cases (see even numbered columns). The coefficient on Chinese imports is 
                                                 
47  We obtain similar results if we implement this approach on the textiles sub-sample in column (3) of Table 2. 
The OLS coefficient (standard error) in column (1) of Table 2 fell to 1.131(0.369) and the IV estimate fell to 
1.767(0.965). 
48  Note that we do not make 6
CH
jtIMP −  specific to country k to mitigate some of the potential endogeneity 
problems with initial conditions. A priori, the instrument has credibility. Amiti and Freund (2010) show that over the 
1997 to 2005 period at least three quarters of the aggregate growth of Chinese imports was from the expansion of 
existing products rather than from adding new products. Similarly, Brambilla et al (2010) find this was true when 
focusing on textiles and clothing after 2001. The concern is that the initial conditions may not be excludable from the 
second stage, however. This may be because the initial level of Chinese imports is correlated with an unobservable 
industry characteristic that affects subsequent technology growth. 
 at Stanford U
niversity on February 9, 2016
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
26 
  
positive, significant and larger in the IV specifications compared to the OLS specifications across 
all three technology equations, just as it was for the quota IV.49 Panel B has the between firm 
employment regressions. Again, the first stages are strong, the coefficients on the interactions all 
remain positive and are significant at the 5% level for two of the three technology variables. Panel 
C repeats the analysis for survival and also finds qualitatively similar results to OLS, although the 
smaller sample sizes mean that the first stages are weaker. 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
5.3. Other Robustness Tests 
We considered a wide range of other robustness tests on the results, the main ones of which are 
reported here (also Online Appendix E for more details). 
Low wage vs. high wage country trade - We define low wage countries as those countries 
with GDP per capita less than 5% of that in the US between 1972 and 2001. On this definition, the 
increase in non-Chinese low wage imports (as a proportion of all imports) 1996-2007 was close to 
zero (0.005), whereas China’s growth was substantial (see Figure 1). Using the normalization by 
domestic production (Table 1 Panel C) we found that in the technology equations the coefficient on 
all low wage countries was essentially the same as the coefficient on China.  We interpret this to 
mean that China is qualitatively no different from other low wage countries - it is just the largest 
trade shock from low wage countries in recent decades.50 
 By contrast, the coefficient on the growth of imports from high wage countries is always 
insignificant either by itself or when Chinese imports are included in the technology equations. We 
followed Bertrand (2004) and used trade-weighted exchange rates as an instrument that, although 
generally significant in the first stages, did not qualitatively change any of our results. One 
explanation is imports from the South make the production of low-tech goods less profitable and 
increases incentives to move up the quality ladder. Rich country imports are more likely to be 
higher tech goods that shrink profit margins, generating a negative Schumpeterian impact of 
innovation, offsetting any pro-innovation effects of competition. 
                                                 
49  If we implement the initial conditions IV in the textiles sub-sample of Table 2 we obtain qualitatively similar 
results to using our baseline quota IV. The results for the textiles sub-sample are also robust to including three-digit 
industry trends as in Table 1 Panel B. 
50 Having said this, the Chinese imports variable tends to dominate the other low wage country imports 
statistically, so we cannot draw very strong conclusions here. Detailed results are in in Online Appendix E. 
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Heterogeneity of the China Effect on innovation - We examined the extent to which the 
China effect was heterogeneous across countries and industries. The coefficients were surprisingly 
stable across countries and we cannot statistically reject homogeneity of the coefficients across 
countries. For example, the F-statistics [p-values] for testing the joint significance of country 
interaction terms in our main technology regressions were: 0.84 [0.592], 1.53 [0.115] and 0.20 
[0.659] (for patents, ICT and TFP respectively). More interestingly, there did appear to be some 
systematic differences across industries. Sectors which had higher industry-specific “wage rents” 
and/or higher lagged TFP responded more to the China shock than those that did not. This appears 
broadly consistent with the trapped factor model of Bloom et al (2013), although of course there are 
alternative explanations.51 
China’s effect on skill demand - We estimated industry level skill demand equations (Online 
Table A10) and found evidence to suggest Chinese imports are associated with a significant 
increase in the wage-bill share of college-educated workers, consistent with the idea of trade 
integration with low-wage countries reducing the relative demand for less skilled workers.52 We 
suggest that trade is having an indirect effect on skill demand through inducing faster technical 
change which, in turn, increases the relative demand for human capital. 
Product and industry switching - A leading compositional theory was that in the face of 
Chinese import competition European firms change their product mix. We do find evidence for 
substantial switching (Online Table A11), especially in sectors more exposed to the China shock 
consistent with Bernard et al (2010). However, this only accounts for a small fraction of the 
correlation of Chinese imports and technological upgrading. 
Exports to China - We have focused on imports from China as driving changes in 
technology, but exports to China may also have an impact through market size effects. Our main 
results are all robust to including controls for exports to China in the regressions (Online Table 
A12). Imports from China appear to be the dominant force on innovation, at least in the micro-data. 
 
                                                 
51 Another angle we investigate if whether there is a stronger effect of trade on quality upgrading for firms closer 
to the quality frontier. Following Khandelwal (2010) we tried interacting imports with his average length of a quality 
ladder in the industry. The interactions typically went in the expected direction, but were insignificant. 
52 Decomposing the wage bill share, Chinese imports have a significant negative association with the total wage 
bill and the wage bill of non-college educated workers. There is a significant positive association with the total wage 
bill of college educated workers. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have examined the impact of trade on technical change in twelve European 
countries. Our motivation is that the rise of China which constitutes perhaps the most important 
exogenous trade shock from low wage countries to hit the “Northern” economies. This helps 
identify the trade-induced technical change hypothesis. We use novel firm and plant level panel data 
on innovation (e.g. patents and R&D) and diffusion (e.g. information technology and TFP) 
combined with four-digit industry-level data on trade.  
 The results are easy to summarize. Our primary result is that the absolute volume of 
innovation as measured by patenting rose within firms who were more exposed to increases in 
Chinese imports. A similar large within firm effect is observed for other indicators of technical 
change such as TFP, IT intensity, R&D expenditure and management practices. Second, in sectors 
more exposed to Chinese imports, jobs and survival rate fell in low-tech firms (e.g. lower patenting 
intensity), but high-tech firms are relatively sheltered (the between firm effect). Both within and 
between firm effects generate aggregate technological upgrading.  
 These results appear to be robust to many tests, including treating imports as endogenous 
using China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 which lead to differential 
abolition of quotas across industries. In terms of magnitudes, China could account for around 15% 
of the overall technical change in Europe between 2000 and 2007. These are likely to be 
underestimates as we also identify a similar sized role for offshoring to China in increasing TFP and 
IT adoption (although not for innovation) and obtain much larger effects under IV. This suggests 
that increased import competition with China has caused a significant technological upgrading in 
European firms in the affected industries through both faster diffusion and innovation. In terms of 
policy, our results imply that reducing import barriers against low wage countries like China may 
bring important welfare gains through technical change. A caveat to this optimistic view is that our 
empirical models are partial equilibrium and do not capture all of the complex welfare effects of 
trade with China.53  What we directly estimate is the impact of increasing trade on innovation on an 
industry-by-industry basis. This is directly relevant for typical trade policy question, such as the 
costs of putting quotas on imports in any particular industry.  
                                                 
53 In Ossa and Hsieh (2010) the reduction of barriers to Chinese imports raises average European firm productivity (as 
we find), but lowers the average quality of Chinese exporters to the EU. Arkolakis et al (2008, 2010) argue that the 
standard gains to trade summarized in the ratio of exports to GDP are not fundamentally altered in a wide class of 
models that allow for heterogeneous firms, but Melitz and Redding (2013) dispute this. More subtly, the innovation 
response in rich countries in sectors where China has comparative advantage (like textiles), might reduce the standard 
Ricardian gains from trade (Levchenko and Zhang, 2010). 
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 There are several directions this work could be taken. First, we would like to investigate 
more deeply the impact of low wage countries on the labor market, using worker level data on the 
non-employment spells and subsequent wages of individuals most affected by Chinese trade. Much 
of the distributional impact depends on the speed at which the reallocation process takes place. 
Second, it would be valuable to complement our European analysis with a similar exercise in other 
countries. In particular, in the US which faced a much more dramatic increase in Chinese import 
competition, and also in developing countries which are technologically closer to China, so could 
potentially both have experienced more negative impacts. Third, we would like to further develop 
our trapped factor model, to see how important it is in explaining trade effects compared to the 
more conventional market size and competition effects. Finally, it would be helpful to structurally 
extend the analysis to take into account general equilibrium effects.  
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TABLE 1: TECHNICAL CHANGE WITHIN INCUMBENT FIRMS AND PLANTS 
 
PANEL A: BASELINE RESULTS  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) ΔTFP 
Estimation method 5 year diffs 5 year diffs 5 year diffs 
Change in Chinese Imports 0.321*** 0.361**  0.257***
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.102) (0.076) (0.072)
Sample period 2005-1996 2007-2000 2005-1995 
Number of Units 8,480 22,957 89,369 
Number of country by industry clusters 1,578 2,816 1,210 
Observations 30,277 37,500 292,167 
 
PANEL B: INCLUDE INDUSTRY TRENDS  
Dependent variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) ΔTFP 
Change in Chinese Imports 0.191* 0.170** 0.128**
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.102) (0.082) (0.053)
Number of Units 8,480 22,957 89,369 
Number of country by industry clusters 1,578 2,816 1,210 
Observations 30,277 37,500 292,167 
 
PANEL C: NORMALIZE IMPORTS BY DOMESTIC PRODUCTION 
Dependent variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) ΔTFP 
Change in Chinese Imports 0.142**   0.129***  0.065***
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.048) (0.028) (0.020)
Number of Units 8,474 20,106 89,369 
Number of country by industry clusters 1,575 2,480 1,210 
Observations 30,221 31,820 292,167 
 
PANEL D: OFFSHORING 
Dependent variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N) ΔTFP 
Change in Chinese Imports 0.313*** 0.279*** 0.188***
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.100) (0.080) (0.082) 
Change Chinese Imports 0.174   1.685*** 1.396***
in source industries OFFSHOREΔ   (0.822) (0.517) (0.504)
Number of Units 8,480 22,957 89,369 
Number of country by industry clusters 1,578 2,816 1,210 
Observations 30,277 37,500 292,167
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Sample period is the 
same in all panels, i.e. 2005-1996 for column (1); 2007-2000 for column (2) and 2005-1995 for column (3). Estimation 
is by OLS with standard errors clustered by country by four-digit industry pair in parentheses. All changes are in five-
year differences, e.g. CHjkIMPΔ represents the five-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of total imports in 
a four-digit industry by country pair. All columns include a full set of country by year dummies. Δln(PATENTS) is the 
change in ln(1+PAT), PAT = count of patents. IT/N is the number of computers per worker. TFP is estimated using the 
de Loecker (2011) version of the Olley-Pakes (1996) method separately for each industry (see Online Appendix C). 
Panel B includes three digit industry trends. Panel C normalizes Chinese imports on domestic production (instead of 
total imports as in other columns). Panel D includes a measure of offshoring  defined as in Feenstra and Hanson (1999) 
except it is for Chinese imports only, not all low wage country imports (see Online Appendix A). The 12 countries 
include Austria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK 
for all columns except (3) which only includes France, Italy, Spain and Sweden (the countries where we have good 
data on intermediate inputs). Dummies for establishment type (Divisional HQ, Divisional Branch, Enterprise HQ or a 
Standalone Branch) are included in column (2).  Units are firms in columns (1) and (3) and plants in column (2). 
 at Stanford U
niversity on February 9, 2016
http://restud.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
 34
 
 
 
TABLE 2: WITHIN FIRM RESULTS - USING CHANGES IN QUOTAS AS AN IV FOR CHINESE IMPORTS  
(CLOTHING AND TEXTILE INDUSTRIES ONLY) 
 
          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
     PATENTING ACTIVITY INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY   TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
Dependent Variable: Δln(PATENTS) ΔIMPCH   Δln(PATENTS)  Δln(IT/N)  ΔIMPCH Δln(IT/N)  ΔTFP ΔIMPCH ΔTFP  
 Method: OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV OLS First Stage IV
Change Chinese Imports  1.160***     1.864* 1.284***  1.851***
      
0.902*** 1.629**
 (0.377)  (1.001) (0.172)  (0.400) (0.087)  (0.326)
Quotas removal  0.108***   0.088***     0.107***  
QUOTA  (0.022)   (0.019)   (0.032)  
          
F-statistic  24.1    21.4    11.5   
Sample period 2005-1999 2005-1999 2005-1999 2005-2000 2005-2000 2005-2000 2005-1999 2005-1999 2005-1999 
Number of units 1,866 1,866 1,866 2,891 2,891 2,891 12,247 12,247 12,247
Number industry clusters 149 149 149 83 83 83 177 177 177
Observations 3,443 3,443 3,443 2,891 2,891 2,891  20,625  20,625  20,625
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. In all panels we use the same specifications as Table 1 columns (1), (2) and (3) but 
estimate by instrumental variables (IV). In Panel A the IV is “Quota removal” is based on EU SIGL data and defined as the (value weighted) proportion of HS6 products in the four-
digit industry that were covered by a quota restriction on China in 2000 (prior to China’s WTO accession) that were planned to be removed by 2005 (see Online Appendix C for 
details). The number of units is the number of firms in all columns except the IT specification where it is the number of plants. All columns include country by year effects. Sample is 
firms in the clothing and textile. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses (the quota IV is defined at the SIC4 industry level and does not 
vary across countries like the Chinese import share, which is why we take the more conservative approach to clustering compared to Table 1). 
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TABLE 3: WITHIN FIRM EFFECTS – INCLUDING FIRM-SPECIFIC TRENDS WITH QUOTAS; TEXTILE AND CLOTHING 
INDUSTRY 
 
 
  
PATENTING 
  
 TOTAL FACTOR PRODUCTIVITY
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dependent Variable: Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) ΔTFP ΔTFP ΔTFP ΔTFP
         
Quotas removal 0.129** 0.216**   0.143*** 0.178***   
*I(year>2000) (0.063) (0.105)   (0.018) (0.037)   
Quotas removal   0.047** 0.075**   0.043*** 0.033*
* # years after 2000   (0.020) (0.033)   (0.005) (0.017)
Firm-specific trends? No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Sample period 2005-1992 2005-1992 2005-1992 2005-1995 2005-1995 2005-1995 2005-1995 2005-1995
Number of firms 2,435 2,435 2,435 2,435 16,495 16,495 16,495 16,495
Number industry clusters 159 159 159 159 187 187 187 187
Observations 14,768 14,768 14,768 14,768 55,791 55,791 55,791 55,791
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. These are the equivalent of the reduced forms underlying Table 2. We use a longer 
sample period than Table 2 in order to include trends. “Quota removal” (QUOTA) is based on EU SIGL data and defined as the (value weighted) proportion of HS6 products in the 
four-digit industry that were covered by a quota restriction on China in 2000 (prior to China’s WTO accession) that were planned to be removed by 2005 (see Online Appendix C for 
details). I(year>2000) is an indicator variable = 1 if observation is after 200 (i.e. after China’s WTO accession). “# years after 2000” is the number of years after 2000 and zero in 2000 
and before (i.e. “# years after 2000”=1 in 2001, =2 in 2002, etc.). All estimates are in five year differences as usual, so we control for firm specific trends by including a firm dummy in 
columns (2), (4), (6) and (8). All columns include country by year effects. Sample is firms in the clothing and textile industry. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered by four-
digit industry in parentheses (the quota IV does not vary across within industry across countries like the Chinese import share, which is why we take the more conservative approach 
compared to Table 1).  
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TABLE 4: BETWEEN FIRM EFFECTS - EMPLOYMENT AND SURVIVAL 
PANEL A: EMPLOYMENT 
Dep. Variable: EMPLOYMENT GROWTH, ln NΔ   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technology variable (TECH) PATENTS PATENTS IT IT TFP TFP
       
Change in Chinese Imports -0.361*** -0.434*** -0.203** -0.379*** -0.377*** -0.377***
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.134) (0.136) (0.086) (0.105) (0.094) (0.096)
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5  1.435**  0.385**  0.795**
CH
jkIMPΔ  *TECHt-5  (0.649)  (0.157)  (0.307)
Technology at t-5 0.389*** 0.348*** 0.241*** 0.230***    0.152*** 0.136***
TECHt-5 (0.043) (0.049) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Number of Units 6,335 6,335 22,957 22,957 89,369 89,369
Number of country by industry clusters 1,376 1,376 2,816 2,816 1,210 1,210
Observations 19,844 19,844 37,500 37,500 292,167 292,167
 
PANEL B: SURVIVAL 
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Technology variable (TECH) PATENTS PATENTS IT IT TFP TFP
Change in Chinese Imports -0.057 -0.078 -0.118** -0.182** -0.207*** -0.208***
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.072) (0.051) (0.050)
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5  0.260**  0.137  0.110*
CH
jkIMPΔ  *TECHt-5  (0.122)  (0.112)  (0.059)
Technology at t-5 0.003 -0.005 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004
TECHt-5 (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003) (0.003)
Survival Rate for Sample (mean) 0.977 0.977 0.886 0.886 0.927 0.927
Number of country by industry clusters 1,647 1,647 2,863 2,863 1,242 1,242
Observations (and number of units) 7,928 7,985 28,624 28,624 60,883 60,883
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation by OLS with standard errors (clustered by country by four-digit 
industry pair) in parentheses. ΔIMPCH is the 5-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of total imports in a four-digit industry by country pair. In columns (1) and (2) 
TECH is ln[(1+ the firm’s patent stock)/employment]; in columns (3) and (4) TECH is computers per employee and in columns (5) and (6) it is TFP. 12 Countries in all columns 
except column (5)-(6) which is four countries. Number of units is the number of firms in all columns except IT where it is the number of plants. All columns include country by 
year effects. In Panel A the dependent variable is the five year difference of ln(employment). The sample period is 2005-1996 for patents, 2007-2000 for IT, and 2005-1995 for 
TFP.  In Panel B the sample period is the 2000-2005 cross-section. The dependent variable is SURVIVAL which refers to whether an establishment in columns (3) or (4) or firm 
(in all other columns) that was alive in 2000 was still alive in 2005. Specifically, we classify an establishment as having exited if it drops out of the panel and does not appear for 
four successive years in columns (3) and (4). In the other columns SURVIVAL it is based on Amadeus company status (see Online Appendix B) where exit is defined on the basis 
of whether a firm that was active in 2000 is recorded as either ‘bankrupt’, ‘liquidated’ or ‘dormant’ in the Company Status variable provided by BVD in 2005 and beyond.  
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TABLE 5: BETWEEN FIRM EFFECTS - USING QUOTA REMOVAL AS AN IV FOR CHINESE IMPORTS  
PANEL A: EMPLOYMENT 
Dep. Variable: EMPLOYMENT GROWTH (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technology variable (TECH) PATENTS PATENTS IT IT TFP TFP
Estimation Technique OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Change in Chinese Imports -1.068** -3.266*** -1.119*** -2.746*** -0.376** -2.041** 
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.453) (1.148) (0.227) (0.735) (0.168) (0.930) 
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5 3.670* 3.256 1.341** 3.481** 0.110 1.058
CH
jkIMPΔ  *TECHt-5 (2.162) (4.609) (0.509) (1.584) (0.441) (0.763) 
Technology at t-5 0.445*** 0.453*** 0.239*** 0.189*** 0.113*** 0.076**
TECHt-5 (0.120) (0.152) (0.027) (0.031) (0.019) (0.031) 
First Stage F-Stat (
CH
jkIMPΔ )  11.7  11.6   10.45 
First Stage F-Stat ( CHjkIMPΔ *TECHt-5)  2.8  11.7   7.66 
Number of Units 1,388 1,388 2,891 2,891 12,247 12,247 
Number of country by industry clusters 140 140 83 83 177 177 
Observations 2,377 2,377 2,891 2,891 20,625 20,625 
PANEL B: SURVIVAL 
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Method: OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Sample: PATENTS   PATENTS   IT IT TFP TFP 
Change in Chinese Imports -0.182 -0.271 -0.483** -1.162***    -0.220*** -0.308* 
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.171) (0.247) (0.200) (0.383) (0.083) (0.142) 
Change in Chinese imports* Technology at t-5 0.432** 
(0.211) 
0.617* 
(0.347) 
0.175 
(0.359) 
0.163 
(0.637) 
0.209* 
(0.110) 
0.243 
(0.159) 
Technology at t-5 -0.024 -0.030 0.002 -0.015 -0.017 -0.018 
TECHt-5 (0.027) (0.032) (0.014) (0.018) (0.009) (0.012) 
First Stage F-Stat ( CHjkIMPΔ )  18.4   13.2   8.68 
First Stage F-Stat ( CHjkIMPΔ  *TECHt-5) 17.9  10.7 7.04 
No of Industry Clusters 113 113 84 84 202 202 
Observations (and number of units) 1,624 1,624 5,980 5,980   11,794  11,794 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Estimation by OLS in odd numbered columns and IV in even 
numbered columns. The instrument is “Quota removal” is based on EU SIGL data and defined as the (value weighted) proportion of HS6 products in the four-digit 
industry that were covered by a quota restriction on China in 2000 (prior to China’s WTO accession) that were planned to be removed by 2005 (see Online 
Appendix C for details). We use two instruments for the two endogenous variables in the IV columns, QUOTA and QUOTA* TECHt-5 (the F-statistics in this case 
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is the joint test of both instruments). ΔIMPCH is the 5-year difference in Chinese imports as a fraction of total imports in a four-digit industry by country pair. In 
columns (1) and (2) TECH is ln[(1+ the firm’s patent stock)/employment]; in columns (3) and (4) TECH is computers per employee and in columns (5) and (6) 
TECH is TFP. 12 Countries in all columns except columns (5) and (6) which is for four countries. Sample is firms in the clothing and textile industry. Standard 
errors for all regressions are clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses (the quota IV does not vary across within industry across countries like the Chinese 
import share, which is why we take the more conservative approach compared to Table 1). In Panel A the dependent variable is the five year difference of 
ln(employment). The sample period is 2005-1996 for patents, 2007-2000 for IT, and 2005-1995 for TFP.  In Panel B the sample period is the 2000-2005 cross-
section. The dependent variable is SURVIVAL which refers to whether an establishment in columns (3) or (4) or firm (in all other columns) that was alive in 2000 
was still alive in 2005. Specifically, we classify an establishment as having exited if it drops out of the panel and does not appear for four successive years in 
columns (3) and (4). In the other columns SURVIVAL it is based on Amadeus company status where exit is defined on the basis of whether a firm that was active 
in 2000 is recorded as either ‘bankrupt’, ‘liquidated’ or ‘dormant’ in the Company Status variable provided by BVD in 2005 and beyond.  
 
 
 
TABLE 6: MAGNITUDES  
 
All Figures are as a % of the total increase over the period 2000-2007 
 
PANEL A: Increase in Patents per employee attributable to Chinese imports  
Period Within Between Exit Total 
Product Market  5.1 6.7 2.1 13.9 
Product market + Offshoring 5.8 8.6 2.7 17.1 
 
PANEL B: Increase in IT per employee attributable to Chinese imports 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
Product Market  9.8 3.0 0.6 13.5 
Product market + Offshoring 23.2 5.4 3.2 31.8 
 
PANEL C: Increase in Total Factor Productivity attributable to Chinese imports 
Period Within Between Exit Total 
Product Market  9.9 2.4 0.2 13.5 
Product market + Offshoring 25.0 7.6 1.1 33.7 
 
Notes: Panel A reports the share of aggregate patents per worker accounted for by China, Panel B the increase in IT per worker and Panel C the increase in Total Factor Productivity. 
In each panel the first row (“Product Market”) uses the coefficients from Tables 1 and 4 to impute the within, between and total impacts of Chinese import competition on 
technological as discussed in section IV.E and detailed in Online Appendix D. The second row also includes the effects of offshoring (see sub-section V.C).  
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TABLE 7: ASSESSING DYNAMIC SELECTION BIAS IN THE PATENTS EQUATION 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  
Estimator 
5 year 
 long differences 
5 year 
 long differences 
Fixed effects 
Negative Binomial 
Fixed effects 
Negative Binomial 
 
Method 
 
Baseline 
 
Worst case Lower Bound 
 
Baseline 
 
Worst case Lower Bound 
 
 
 Change in Chinese Imports 0.321*** 0.271***    
( )/China Worldjk jkM MΔ  (0.102) (0.098)    
 Level of Chinese Imports   0.398*** 0.395***  
( )/China Worldjk jkM M    (0.168) (0.166)  
      
Number of Clusters 1,578 1,662 1,578 1,620  
Number of Firms 8,480 8,732 8,480 8,732  
Number of Observations 30,277 31,272 74,038 74,486  
 
Notes: *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. Dependent variable is ln(PATENTS) in columns (1) and (2), and the 
count of patents in the Negative Binomial specifications in columns (3) and (4). The sample period is 1996-2005 for all columns. Estimation in columns (1) and (2) 
is by OLS in long-differences and by Negative Binomial count data model with fixed effects using the Blundell et al (1999) technique in columns (3) and (4). 
Standard errors (clustered by country by four-digit industry pair) in parentheses. “Worst case lower bounds” impute a value of zero to all observations through 2005 
where a firm dies (death is defined as in Table 5 Panel B). There are more observations for the Negative Binomial than five year long differences as we are using 
observations with less than five continuous years. All columns include a full set of country by year dummies. 12 countries included in all samples. 
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TABLE 8: USING “INITIAL CONDITIONS” AS AN INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE 
 
PANEL A: WITHIN FIRM TECHNOLOGY EQUATIONS 
 
 
PANEL B: EMPLOYMENT 
 
Dependent Variable: Employment Growth (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technology variable (TECH) PATENTS PATENTS IT IT TFP TFP
  Method: OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Change in Chinese Imports -0.434*** -0.734*** -0.379*** -1.070*** -0.377*** -2.039*** 
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.137) (0.313) (0.130) (0.258) (0.108) (0.555) 
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5 1.434** 0.876 0.385** 1.473*** 0.795** 2.443*** 
CH
jkIMPΔ  *TECHt-5 (0.560) (1.634) (0.180) (0.587) (0.347) (0.804) 
Technology at t-5  0.348*** 0.365*** 0.230*** 0.199*** 0.136***   0.103*** 
TECHt-5 (0.049) (0.071) (0.01) (0.020) (0.013) (0.020) 
First Stage for ( CHjkIMPΔ ), F-Statistic  39.3 
 
22.6 
 
15.6 
First Stage for ( CHjkIMPΔ *TECHt-5), F-Stat  31.8 
 
24.2 
 
13.3 
Number of Units 6,335 6,335 22,957 22,957 89,369 89,369 
Industry clusters 300 300 371 371 354 354 
Observations 19,844 19,844 37,500 37,500 292,167 292,167 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent Variable Δln(PATENTS) Δln(PATENTS) Δln(IT/N)   Δln(IT/N)   ΔTFP ΔTFP 
  Method: OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Change in Chinese Imports 0.321*** 0.494** 0.361*** 0.593*** 0.257*** 0.507* 
 (0.117) (0.224) (0.106) (0.252) (0.087) (0.283) 
Initial Condition IV        
First-stage F-Statistic  95.1  38.7  14.5 
Sample period 2005-1996 2005-1996 2007-2000 2007-2000 2005-1996 2005-1996 
Number of Units 8,480 8,480 22,957 22,957 89,369 89,369 
Number of industry clusters 304 304 371 371 354 354 
Observations  30,277  30,277 37,500 37,500 292,167 292,167 
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PANEL C: SURVIVAL 
 
Dependent Variable: SURVIVAL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Technology variable (TECH) PATENTS PATENTS IT IT TFP TFP 
  Method: OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV 
Change in Chinese Imports -0.078 -0.428 -0.182** -0.797*** -0.208*** -0.955*** 
CH
jkIMPΔ  (0.051) (0.454) (0.077) (0.275) (0.067) (0.317) 
Change in Chinese imports*technology at t-5 0.260** 0.793 0.137 0.490 0.110** 0.314** 
CH
jkIMPΔ  *TECHt-5 (0.114) (0.494) (0.117) (0.471) (0.055) (0.159) 
Technology at t-5  -0.005 -0.022 -0.002 -0.014 -0.004 -0.010 
TECHt-5 (0.009) (0.016) (0.007) (0.014) (0.003) (0.006) 
First Stage for ( CHjkIMPΔ ), F-Statistic  14.4  7.82  2.94 
First Stage for ( CHjkIMPΔ *TECHt-5), F-Stat  21.7  7.73  2.97 
Industry clusters 328 328 372 372 379 379 
Observations (and Number of Units) 7,928 7,928 28,624 28,624 60,883 60,883 
 
Notes:  *** denotes 1% significance; ** denotes 5% significance; * denotes 10% significance. In Panel A we use the same specifications as Table 1 Panel A from 
columns (1), (3) and (5) but estimate by instrumental variables (IV) in the even numbered columns. Similarly in Panels B and C we use Table 4 Panel A and B 
respectively (columns (2), (4) and (6)) for the odd numbered columns in Table 8. IV equivalents are in even numbered columns. The Initial Conditions IV is the 
share of Chinese imports (in all imports) in the four-digit industry across the whole of the Europe and the US (6 years earlier) interacted with the aggregate growth 
in Chinese imports in Europe. In Panels B and C we have two instruments: the linear initial conditions and the initial conditions interacted with TECHt-5 (the F-
statistics in this case is the joint test of both instruments). The number of units is the number of firms in all columns except the IT specification where it is the 
number of plants. All columns include country by year effects. Standard errors for all regressions are clustered by four-digit industry in parentheses. 
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